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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 18-1232
_____________
ARIF SARKER,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_____________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A206-498-043)
Immigration Judge: Rosalind K. Malloy
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 11, 2018
______________
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 28, 2018)
______________
OPINION*
______________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Arif Sarker petitions for review of a final order of review issued by the Board of

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
petition for review.
I.
Sarker, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, arrived in the United States in March
2014. Sarker was thereafter served with a Notice to Appear, charging him with
removability under the Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for not being in possession of a valid entry document. In
November 2014, he filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), predicated on his claim that
he had been persecuted for his involvement in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(“BNP”). An asylum officer found that Sarker demonstrated a credible fear of
persecution or torture, and referred his application to an immigration judge (“IJ”) for
further proceedings. Sarker conceded removability and renewed his application for
asylum and related relief.
At his administrative hearing, Sarker testified that since 1999 he has been a
member of the BNP, which is in opposition to the current ruling party of Bangladesh, the
Awami League. Sarker claimed that he was first approached by members of the Awami
League in his home town of Comilla, Bangladesh, in January 2013, when two men asked
him to join the Awami League and he refused. Sarker testified that his refusal to join the
Awami League angered the men, and that he was assaulted and intimidated by members
of the Awami League in Comilla on multiple occasions because of his refusal to join the
party. Sarker made arrangements to leave Bangladesh following these incidents, and
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stayed at his aunt’s house in Dhaka until he could leave the country.
The IJ was unable to conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Sarker
suffered past persecution on account of his political opinion or that he would be
persecuted upon his return to Bangladesh. In addition, the IJ determined that Sarker has
the opportunity to safely relocate to a different city in Bangladesh. The IJ denied each
of Sarker’s applications for relief and ordered him removed to Bangladesh.
Sarker appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA and, in a January 2018 decision, the
BIA dismissed his appeal. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding that Sarker failed to
establish that he suffered past persecution. Additionally, the BIA agreed that Sarker had
not met his burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. In
particular, the BIA noted that Sarker stayed in Dhaka before leaving the country and was
not harmed there, and so concluded that he could relocate within Bangladesh without
further harm. The BIA accordingly agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Sarker did not
satisfy the burden of proof required for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA
further found that Sarker failed to demonstrate a clear probability that he would be
tortured upon his return to Bangladesh, considering the finding that Sarker could safely
relocate within Bangladesh and avoid detection by members of the Awami League. The
BIA therefore agreed with the IJ’s determination that Sarker was not eligible for CAT
relief. Sarker filed a timely petition for review.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a). We “accept factual findings if supported by substantial evidence,” meaning
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we must “uphold the agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel any
reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.” Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220
(3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Although we review the BIA’s decision, we also
consider the IJ’s opinion “where the BIA has substantially relied on that opinion.”
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009), as amended (Nov. 4, 2009).
III.
Section 208 of the INA gives the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to a
removable alien who qualifies as a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The term “refugee”
is defined by statute, in relevant part, as any person who is unable or unwilling to return
to their country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). We have defined persecution as
“threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Camara, 580 F.3d at 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “Importantly, the concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment that
our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Sarker argues on appeal that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s determination that
he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. We disagree.
“An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant
could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of
nationality . . . if under the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant
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to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Substantial evidence supports the finding that
Sarker would be able to reasonably and safely relocate within Bangladesh. In this
regard, it is significant that Sarker is not a prominent or well-known member of the BNP
and was able to remain safely in Dhaka for a time before departing for the United States.
Sarker’s argument that the IJ’s finding directly contradicts certain record
evidence—including accounts of threats made against Sarker’s family, that Sarker’s
father remains in hiding, that Sarker only stayed in Dhaka for a short time, that the
Awami League is the current ruling party in Bangladesh, and that politically motivated
killings continue—is unavailing. Although this evidence was potentially probative of
future persecution, the IJ was entitled to discredit any portion of it. The IJ was further
entitled to weigh it against the other evidence presented. So long as the IJ’s ultimate
finding was supported by substantial evidence, we will not disturb it on the basis of
contrary evidence in the record.1
Sarker also argues that he should have been granted withholding of removal and
relief under the CAT. However, because Sarker did not satisfy the requirements for
asylum, he cannot meet those for withholding of removal. See Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349

Sarker also argues on appeal that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s finding that he
failed to demonstrate past persecution. However, even assuming that Sarker
demonstrated that he suffered past persecution, the finding that he could reasonably and
safely relocate in Bangladesh is dispositive of his claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)
(specifying that an IJ “shall deny the asylum application of an alien found to be a
refugee on the basis of past persecution if any of the following is found by a
preponderance of the evidence: . . . (B) The applicant could avoid future persecution by
relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all the
circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.”). Accordingly,
we do not address the issue of past persecution.
1
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F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 2003) (an alien who fails to demonstrate well-founded fear of
future persecution for purposes of asylum cannot overcome the standard for withholding
of removal). Nor has he demonstrated eligibility for protection pursuant to the CAT by
showing that, upon his return to Bangladesh, he is likely to suffer “severe pain and
suffering” inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290
F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir.2002) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). As noted by the BIA,
evidence that Sarker could relocate to a part of Bangladesh where he is not likely to be
tortured is relevant to his eligibility under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii).
As with the finding on Sarker’s eligibility for asylum, evidence that Sarker was able to
remain safely in Dhaka before departing for the United States, as well as the
unlikelihood that Sarker would be singled out as a member of the BNP in Dhaka,
provide substantial evidence supporting the agency’s finding on Sarker’s claim under the
CAT.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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